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Negative Brief: Taiwan Submarines

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / OPENING QUOTES

Counter Criterion: Better US foreign relations with China. This should be our foreign policy goal because improving the US relationship with China is critical for us and the rest of the world

Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Univ. of Virginia 2011 (report of a conference of experts, managed by: **Admiral Joseph W. Prueher** - the Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor; consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies; former US Ambassador to China. **Heather Mullins Crislip** is a Visiting Fellow coordinating the Miller Center’s Policy Programs. She also served as the Staff Director of the David R. Goode National Transportation Conference at the Miller Center. **Taylor Reveley** is the Associate Director of the Miller Center. He has served as the coordinating attorney for the Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. Mr. Reveley previously was an attorney with Hunton & Williams) “A Way Ahead With China” 2011 <http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf>

The PRC has gone through years of great tribulations, and is in the process of both exercising and returning to great power status in the world. The United States is also adjusting to China’s rise to world power. Arguably, the U.S. relationship with China is the largest and most critical one for us to get right. This immense, multifaceted relationship encompassing political, economic, cultural, and military aspects is generally stable. The relationship has the potential to be much better, not only for China and the U.S., but for a world that can only benefit from a more stable, more predictable and more positive future.

Improved US/China relationship is imperative

*Retired Admiral Bill Owens 2009 (former vice-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) 17 Nov 2009* America must start treating China as a friend <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/69241506-d3b2-11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html>

The US-China relationship is a vital interest for the two countries and the world. Throughout history, great powers have tended to become adversaries. Now, for a few years, we have a chance to break that cycle. It will take strong and enduring commitment on both sides. But a new and engaging relationship is imperative for our common good.

The US and China have potential for much better relationship, and the world would benefit from it

Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Univ. of Virginia 2011 (report of a conference of experts, managed by: **Admiral Joseph W. Prueher** is the Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor; consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies; former US Ambassador to China. **Heather Mullins Crislip** is a Visiting Fellow coordinating the Miller Center’s Policy Programs. She also served as the Staff Director of the David R. Goode National Transportation Conference at the Miller Center. **Taylor Reveley** is the Associate Director of the Miller Center. He has served as the coordinating attorney for the Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. Mr. Reveley previously was an attorney with Hunton & Williams) “A Way Ahead With China” 2011 <http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf>

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INHERENCY

US technology not needed: Many international firms are willing to do the work

Wendell Minnick 2014 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 16 Dec 2014 Taiwan Pressing On With Local Sub Build <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2014/12/16/taiwan-pressing-on-with-local-sub-build/20477063/>

Since 2013, Taiwan's Navy has sponsored three IDS seminars with international participation. These include an academic seminar in September 2013, a technical seminar in June and then a managerial seminar in early November. All three saw participation from Australia, US, Italy, France and other unnamed European countries. The November seminar included industrial site visits to Taiwan industries involved in shipbuilding, including Kaohsiung-based shipbuilder CSBC in southern Taiwan. The visits gave international companies a chance to judge what they could provide to the IDS program that Taiwan's industries could not. Possible objections that China's government might raise are also causing concern. Yet, the international firms are keen to work the contract. "There is a lot of international interest in helping us build the submarines," the Navy official said.

HARMS/ SIGNIFICANCE

Harm/Solvency Dilemma: Taiwan’s defense spending declining

Harm Response: If the Chinese threat is so big, why doesn’t Taiwan think so? Maybe it’s not so big after all

Solvency Response: If the Chinese threat is so big, and Taiwan won’t spend money on its own defense, then it seems useless to try to help them

Craig Murray and Kyle Churchman 2013 (both are with the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Murray is Senior Policy Analyst, Military and Security Affairs. Churchman is Research Intern) 11 June 2013 Taiwan’s Declining Defense Spending Could Jeopardize Military Preparedness <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Taiwan%E2%80%99s%20Declining%20Defense%20Spending%20Could%20Jeopardize%20Military%20Preparedness_Staff%20Research%20Backgrounder.pdf>

Despite its growing military disadvantage relative to China, Taiwan’s defense budget continues to decline. Taiwan's official 2013 defense budget contracted to NT $312.7 billion (U.S. $10.5 billion) from NT $317.3 (U.S. $10.6 billion) in 2012. According to the Congressional Research Service, Taiwan’s current defense spending represents 2.1 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), a record low matched only in 2006 and 2011. This is considerably less than 3 percent of GDP – the level at which President Ma Ying-jeou pledged to maintain defense spending – and marks a substantial decrease from 3.8 percent of GDP in 1994. Furthermore, defense spending accounts for only 16.2 percent of the total government budget in 2013, down from 24.3 percent in 1994. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has stated publicly it would use supplemental funds to pay for arms sales from the United States.

Low defense spending means Taiwan doesn’t think there’s much of a threat

Bonnie Glaser and Anastasia Mark 2015 (Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is also a senior associate with Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia. Mark is a Masters candidate at Georgetown’s Asia Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service and works as an intern for CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Project. She has over four years of experience living in China ) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 18 Mar 2015 TAIWAN’S DEFENSE SPENDING: THE SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF CHOOSING BUTTER OVER GUNS <http://amti.csis.org/taiwans-defense-spending-the-security-consequences-of-choosing-butter-over-guns/>

Second, Taipei’s low defense spending raises questions about Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense, which could have implications for U.S. willingness to help defend the island in the event of a PRC attack. Why, then, is Taiwan not allocating greater resources to defense?  A major factor is the improvement in cross-Strait relations, which has importantly lowered the risk of conflict, but has also [reduced public perception](http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/472810562541.gif) of the threat from Mainland China. Since coming to power in 2008, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has overseen a new phase of stabilization in China-Taiwan relations in which economic and social exchanges have expanded dramatically. As a result, Taiwan’s citizens’ fears of a military attack have receded.

Lack of Chinese military capability

China lacks amphibious attack capability to invade Taiwan

Greg Austin 2015 (Professorial Fellow with the EastWest Institute in New York and a Visiting Professor at the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, at the Australian Defence Force Academy ) 17 Feb 2015 US China Commission Moves Beyond the 'China Threat' Hype THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/us-china-commission-moves-beyond-the-china-threat-hype/> (brackets added)

Such questions are, one assumes, among the departure points of the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on the military developments in the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. Yet in the 2014 [Pentagon report](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf" \t "_blank), the word weakness does not seem to appear. The word “lack” appears only twice, and the word “shortcoming” appears only twice. But the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] shortcomings are so profound, as the 200-page RAND report suggests, that they probably need a lot more attention in public than the Pentagon has been willing (or politically brave enough) to discuss or canvas objectively. For example, the Pentagon report notes that China “lacks the amphibious lift capacity that a large-scale invasion of Taiwan would require.” So surely that must affect the type of threat China represents to United States interests. That is a pretty big “weakness” on the only significant military confrontation dividing China and the United States.

Chinese military (PLA – People’s Liberation Army) is weak and cannot carry out substantial missions

RAND Corporation research report sponsored by the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission 2015. (RAND is a non-profit research organization. US-CE&SRC is an agency created by Congress to study US-China foreign policy. This study’s authors were: Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz ) Feb 2015 China’s Incomplete Military Transformation - Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Incomplete%20Military%20Transformation_2.11.15.pdf>

We have found that the PLA suffers from potentially serious weaknesses. These shortcomings could limit its ability to successfully conduct the information-centric, integrated joint operations Chinese military strategists see as required to fight and win future wars. Chinese military writers and outside analysts generally agree that these weaknesses fall into two broad categories. The first is institutional. The PLA faces shortcomings stemming from outdated command structures, quality of personnel, professionalism, and corruption. The second set of weaknesses centers on combat capabilities. These shortcomings include logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in fleet air defense and antisubmarine warfare. Although the PLA’s capabilities have improved dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Communist Party leaders may task it to execute, such as in various Taiwan contingencies, maritime claim missions, sea line of communication protection, and some military operations other than war scenarios.

“Moral imperative to support Taiwan” – Response: US policy must be based on US security, we have no obligation to do what other countries want us to do

Prof. Charles Glaser 2011. (*Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

Douglas Paal, meanwhile, believes that the people of Taiwan should have a large say in U.S. decision-making. International politics, however, rarely works this way. Especially when important national security interests are at stake, states make foreign policy decisions based on their own interests. Friends, allies, and adversaries may not like these decisions, but they have little choice but to adapt to them.

SOLVENCY

1. Not solving the real barrier.

Taiwan’s President is blocking the submarine program, not Washington

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/> (brackets added)

Compared to the KMT, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is more proactive on the IDS [Indigenous Defense Submarine] program. In the DPP’s Fifth Defense Policy Blue Paper, China’s Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025, released in March 2014, then-Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang [called for a concept](http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/20140303_DPP_Defense_Blue_Paper_5.pdf" \t "_blank) of “two-stage indigenous production of submarines.” Six months later, the DPP published its Seventh Defense Policy Blue Paper, Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries, which was endorsed by Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen. It [offered](http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/20141005_DPP_Defense_Blue_Paper_7.pdf" \t "_blank) a more detailed description of the concept. The DPP set out a number of viewpoints:  
1. The biggest obstacle to building submarines domestically is not in Kaohsiung; it is not in Washington D.C.; it is in Taiwan’s Presidential Office. Vague policies have further complicated an already complex and risky project of indigenously building submarines.

2. Too expensive

There’s not enough time nor money to make Taiwan submarines effective

*Lauren Dickey 2014 (research associate for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations) 15 Sept 2014 “*Taiwan Wants to Buy U.S. Subs; This Would Be a Bad Deal for Both Countries *“* <http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/09/15/taiwan-wants-to-buy-u-s-subs-this-would-be-a-bad-deal-for-both-countries/>

Beijing’s military capabilities will but only increase in the years ahead, particularly as reunification with Taiwan remains a top priority item on the Communist Party’s agenda. But as military capabilities evolve, so too will political environment. In the case a more conservative government emerges after mid-term elections in November, or perhaps more importantly, a pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government steps into lead Taiwan in 2016, the need to reevaluate Taiwan’s defense requests will persist. But for now, as Washington’s rebalance to Asia plays out, there is neither time nor money requisite to help the island develop its nascent submarine program.

Taiwan submarine plan will cost Taiwan about $567 million per year for the next 23 to 25 years

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/> (Brackets added. NT$ is the currency of Taiwan. The New Taiwan Dollar is worth about 3.2 cents in US money)

The goal of stage two is to design and produce six or more submarines of 1500-ton surface displacement to form a fleet of eight and establish a sufficient submarine force, and to increase Taiwan’s submarine building capacity. Once the project is initiated (projected at 2017), production of a new submarine will start every three years. The first submarine will be completed approximately eight to ten years after the program launch (between 2025 and 2027), completing the production of six submarines in 23 to 25 years (between 2040 and 2042). The estimated cost for both stages is between NT$ [New Taiwan Dollars] 350 to $400 billion (US$11.5 to 13.1 billion). With the projected 23-years timeframe, an estimated NT$17.3 billion (US$567.6 million) will be required each year.

Impact: Plan won’t work because Taiwan can’t afford it

William Lowther 2014 (journalist) TAIPEI TIMES 17 Sept 2014 Submarine sales to Taiwan ‘improbable’: US council <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/09/17/2003599903>

Submarine sales to Taiwan are “highly improbable,” a new commentary published by the US Council on Foreign Relations says. “Transferring submarine technology to the island will take too long and cost the Taiwanese military far more than what it can afford,” council research associate Lauren Dickey said. She said that the costs the US would incur to resurrect small numbers of diesel-powered submarines for Taipei would yield few benefits for the US military.

3. No objective criterion for success

We can’t know what weapons Taiwan needs because they don’t have a clear defense strategy

Wendell Minnick 2015 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 27 May 2015 DEFENSE NEWS Taiwan Pushes for New Weapons on All Fronts <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/05/27/taiwan-requirements-submarine-frigate-destroyer-helicopter-budget-china/26860647/>

When the US government or a US think tank complains that the Taiwanese are not spending enough on defense, they are talking about dollar value, not quality, said Ching Chang, research fellow for the conservative ROC Society for Strategic Studies. "Value is subjective," he said. "How can you decide what kind of weapons you need when you do not know what size of military force you will have in 10 years? Do you prepare to fight China based on force levels of the past, with 300,000 troops? This would be very different from the current 170,000 troops. What about a reduced force of 100,000? How can the US define the value of Taiwan's budget numbers based solely on how much US weapons they procure?"

4. Little security benefit

A few submarines won’t make any difference in Taiwan’s defense

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/>

As for the number eight, whether this is in line with Taiwan’s future defense needs is also doubtful. Given the maintenance cycle, only four or five submarines will be combat ready when in contingency. This number is extremely low for Taiwan’s maritime defense, either in tactically centralized or dispersive deployment. In a real conflict, “better than nothing” is of little comfort. Moreover, the acquisition of the first submarine is too slow in both DPP and MND’s plans.

5. Declining Taiwan Defense Budgets. Cross-apply the Harms evidence above about Taiwan perceiving no threat.

The only way Taiwan could deter a Chinese threat is by increasing defense spending, but they won’t do it

Bonnie Glaser and Anastasia Mark 2015 (Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is also a senior associate with Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia. Mark is a Masters candidate at Georgetown’s Asia Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service and works as an intern for CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Project. She has over four years of experience living in China ) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 18 Mar 2015 TAIWAN’S DEFENSE SPENDING: THE SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF CHOOSING BUTTER OVER GUNS <http://amti.csis.org/taiwans-defense-spending-the-security-consequences-of-choosing-butter-over-guns/>

More resources are evidently needed.  The DPP promises to raise the defense budget to 3 percent of GDP if it returns to power, but many observers are skeptical that it would follow through on this pledge. After all, when the DPP was the ruling party, defense spending dropped annually as a percentage of GDP from 2.9 in 2001 to 2.1 in 2006, and then inched upwards to 2.4 percent in 2007, its final year in office. This suggests that regardless of which party is elected in 2016, significant increases in defense spending are unlikely. Competing pressures from the electorate to support social welfare programs means that a marginal reversal of the current downward trend is the best case scenario. Taiwan cannot outspend China and it cannot prevent the cross-Strait capabilities gap from widening. But Taiwan can raise the costs and risks to the PRC of an attack, which would likely reduce the possibility that Beijing will opt to use military force to achieve its goals. To do so, Taiwan must devote greater resources to defense spending.

6. No military solution.

A recent Taiwan military study concludes that no amount of US military support could save Taiwan from Chinese attack

Retired Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr 2013. (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; and former Director of Chinese Affairs at the US State Department) 16 Nov 2013 The Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle, Remarks to an Academic Seminar at the Miller Center, University of Virginia <http://chasfreeman.net/beijing-taipei-washington-triangle/>

In practice, if not yet rhetorically, Taipei also seems to have altered its military strategy, including its approach to arms purchases from the United States.  The military balance in the Taiwan Strait has shifted so decisively in favor of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that it’s no longer possible to sustain the fantasy that an island of 23 million people can balance the military power of a dynamic society of 1.3 billion. Whatever the answer to Taiwan’s continued survival as a prosperous democratic society may be, it’s not military.  By 2020, according to a recent report from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the PLA may be able to overwhelm the island even in the face of armed U.S. opposition.  This finding leads ineluctably to a judgment that cross-Strait challenges must be met by political rather than military means.  Such a judgment is implicit in the fact that Taipei’s defense budget has been shrinking, while Beijing’s continues its rapid growth.

Even Taiwan knows that their arms requests don’t really matter – they’re only for political value

Retired Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr 2013. (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; and former Director of Chinese Affairs at the US State Department) 16 Nov 2013 The Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle, Remarks to an Academic Seminar at the Miller Center, University of Virginia <http://chasfreeman.net/beijing-taipei-washington-triangle/>

In the past, Taipei sought approval of weapons purchases from Washington as much or more for their political value as tokens of American politico-military support as for their contributions to its defense.  Taipei still asks for advanced American weaponry, but there is now no money and not much oomph behind these requests.  They hold Taiwan’s military-industrial constituency in America in thrall to continuing dreams of a lucrative arms market.

Taiwan arms sales have no effect on security – the balance of power is irreversibly in favor of China


Retired Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr 2013. (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; and former Director of Chinese Affairs at the US State Department) 16 Nov 2013 The Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle, Remarks to an Academic Seminar at the Miller Center, University of Virginia <http://chasfreeman.net/beijing-taipei-washington-triangle/>

Taipei still asks for advanced American weaponry, but there is now no money and not much oomph behind these requests.  They hold Taiwan’s military-industrial constituency in America in thrall to continuing dreams of a lucrative arms market.  If realized, however, these sales would not have much, if any, effect on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.  With that balance now irreversibly in favor of the mainland, U.S. weapons transfers cannot boost the island’s sense of security as they once did.  Still less do U.S. arms sales serve to embolden Taiwan’s political elite to defy Beijing or the logic of eventual reunification with the mainland, as Beijing long supposed they did.

7. No US business benefit.

China will sanction US companies involved in Taiwan arms sales, so they’ll lose business if the plan works

Prof. Suisheng Zhao 2013 (professor of Chinese politics and foreign policy at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies) “Core interests and great power responsibilities – The evolving pattern of China’s foreign policy” China and the International System: Becoming a World Power, Chapter 3 <https://books.google.fr/books?id=Jm6krAh2LS0C&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=arms+sales+taiwan+anger+china&source=bl&ots=j1ahxOIulE&sig=kKg8jyHvPiFd6hQBoAxtBEH8b10&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEwQ6AEwB2oVChMIrduOst2exgIVBdUUCh2jHADn#v=onepage&q=arms%20sales%20taiwan%20anger%20china&f=false>



DISADVANTAGES

1. Wrong equipment

Diesel submarines are not effective and would do more harm than good by making Taiwan more vulnerable

*Lauren Dickey 2014 (research associate for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations) 15 Sept 2014 “*Taiwan Wants to Buy U.S. Subs; This Would Be a Bad Deal for Both Countries *“* <http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/09/15/taiwan-wants-to-buy-u-s-subs-this-would-be-a-bad-deal-for-both-countries/>

Taiwan’s government can and should look to expand its offensive and defensive capabilities, but U.S. submarines are not the solution. Rather than looking to high cost submarine programs, Taiwan may be better served developing other capabilities to deter Chinese short-term military coercion without immediate intervention from abroad, a so-called “[porcupine strategy](https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ae650b06-a5e4-4b64-b4fd-2bcc8665c399/Revisiting-Taiwan-s-Defense-Strategy---William-S--.aspx" \t "_blank).” While intended to defend against Beijing’s increasingly capable surface forces and submarines, any submarines acquired by Taiwan may actually do [more harm than good](https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ae650b06-a5e4-4b64-b4fd-2bcc8665c399/Revisiting-Taiwan-s-Defense-Strategy---William-S--.aspx" \t "_blank), due to their vulnerabilities to existing Chinese weapons. **Simply put, diesel submarines are not the effective defensive capability the island wants or needs.**

2. Taiwan Defense Contracting Corruption

Link: Taiwan legislators are corrupt and ripoff defense deals for their own enrichment.   
Impact: Taiwan’s defense industrial capabilities are stunted

Wendell Minnick 2015 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 27 May 2015 DEFENSE NEWS Taiwan Pushes for New Weapons on All Fronts <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/05/27/taiwan-requirements-submarine-frigate-destroyer-helicopter-budget-china/26860647/>

 Corruption is a factor in all arms sales, said a US defense analyst. Members of the legislature's defense committee get the lion share of kickbacks. This applies even to legislative defense committee members who have business interests in China. It is not unusual for legislative aides to also serve as local agents for US defense companies, sub rosa. Foreign arms deals provide more cash than domestic build programs, and this has stunted Taiwan's defense industrial capabilities.

3. Chinese Espionage

Link: Taiwan has a history of passing classified defense technology to China, and submarines would be at risk

*Lauren Dickey 2014 (research associate for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations) 15 Sept 2014 “*Taiwan Wants to Buy U.S. Subs; This Would Be a Bad Deal for Both Countries *“* <http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/09/15/taiwan-wants-to-buy-u-s-subs-this-would-be-a-bad-deal-for-both-countries/>

The current strategic advantage the United States has in its use and ownership of nuclear submarines is not something the Pentagon should be eager to share with others. As Taiwanese military officials have an unfortunate history of passing [classified military information](http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140428/DEFREG03/304280015/Taiwan-Air-Force-Major-Jailed-Spying-China" \t "_blank) into the hands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Washington should [remain cautious](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwanese-spies-undermine-us-confidence-ex-diplomat-says/2013/03/19/40e59150-90ba-11e2-9abd-e4c5c9dc5e90_story.html" \t "_blank) in transferring any sensitive technology or capabilities to Taiwan. These cost-benefit concerns, as well as those of espionage, emerged initially around the Bush submarine deal in 2001, but linger today as the Pentagon appears to weigh the option of a submarine program with Taiwan.


Impact: Turn Affirmative’s “Chinese Threat” harms. Chinese military development raises the challenges to Taiwan’s security

US Dept of Defense 2013. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (first brackets added, second brackets, quotations, and ellipses in original) [https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress\_djvu.txt](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress_djvu.txt&sa=D&ust=1443092014881000&usg=AFQjCNGjKtVwX1slF_VonbJs6Ph52dBjhw" \t "_blank)

Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, however, there have been no signs that China’s military disposition opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

Impact: Hurts US businesses and national security. Chinese technology theft hurts US business interests and threatens national security

Dr. Edward J. Maggio 2009 (PhD; Assistant Professor, Criminal Justice, New York Institute of Technology ) Private Security in the 21st Century <https://books.google.fr/books?id=CZNdwscVq1EC&pg=PA303&lpg=PA303&dq=national+security+china+technology+theft&source=bl&ots=suyk2A9RLt&sig=yLxYPeKuuZxb3dXfQxWfga0Wpzk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAzgKahUKEwjHk8712Z7GAhWBaRQKHa8XABo#v=onepage&q=national%20security%20china%20technology%20theft&f=false>



4. China Gets Mad

Link: Selling subs to Taiwan will anger China

Wendell Minnick 2009 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 19 Oct 2009 Lacking Boats, Taiwan Sub Office in U.S. May Shut Down <http://minnickarticles.blogspot.fr/2009/10/lacking-boats-taiwan-sub-office-in-us_19.html>

In 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush offered to build Taiwan eight diesel-electric submarines. However, the United States has not been able to carry out that deal because it no longer builds non-nuclear submarines, and third-country manufacturers have been reluctant to anger China by selling subs to Taiwan. The sale has been in limbo ever since.

Brink: When subs were first proposed in 2001, China said they would cross a red line because they’re offensive, not defensive

CNN 2001. “Beijing anger expected over U.S.-Taiwan arms sales” 24 Apr 2001 <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/23/taiwan.arms/index.html>

Beijing had promised dire consequences if the United States sold the Aegis system to Taiwan. But it also considers submarines to be offensive weapons and therefore, in its view, not covered by terms of the Taiwan Relations Act that pledges U.S. support for the island democracy's defenses. "I think there will be some substantive actions and this will come very soon," said Wu Xinbo, a professor at the Fudan University Centre for American Studies in Shanghai. Wu, who writes on U.S.-China security issues, said China had considered submarines as "red-line" items on Taiwan's defense shopping list, along with the Aegis system and the PAC-3 missile defense system.

Brink: Submarine sales to Taiwan would cross a red line for China on US/China relations

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/> (brackets added)

Since China condemns the U.S. for every arms sale, even that involving used warships, any U.S. assistance – direct or indirect – in Taiwan’s efforts to acquire submarines will all no doubt cross the “red line” drawn by China. The reaction is likely to be stronger than that when the U.S. approved the sale of 150 F-16 A/B fighters in 1992 or in this recent Perry-class case. The impact on Sino-U.S. relations of the submarine sale will be a critical factor for the U.S. to consider.

Impact: The most important foreign policy goal is US-China cooperation. We need China to solve every major global challenge

US-China Smart Power Commission 2009(chaired by former US Defense Secretary William Cohen and Maurice R. Greenberg), March 2009, "Smart Power in US-China Relations," CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf>

The evolution of Sino-US relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable US alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of US and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of US-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without US-China cooperation.

Impact: Worsens cycle of tensions and problems in US/China/Taiwan relations

Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Univ. of Virginia 2011 (report of a conference of experts, managed by: **Admiral Joseph W. Prueher** is the Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor; consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies; former US Ambassador to China. **Heather Mullins Crislip** is a Visiting Fellow coordinating the Miller Center’s Policy Programs. She also served as the Staff Director of the David R. Goode National Transportation Conference at the Miller Center. **Taylor Reveley** is the Associate Director of the Miller Center. He has served as the coordinating attorney for the Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. Mr. Reveley previously was an attorney with Hunton & Williams) “A Way Ahead With China” 2011 <http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf>

A peaceful resolution of the long standing Taiwan issue, acceptable on both sides of the strait would indeed be a boon to stability in East Asia, as well as to U.S./China relations. It is also an issue where progress can be made. Taiwan has over time and with our encouragement become an economically successful democratic polity. Unfortunately, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are part of a vicious circle, leading to the Taiwan issue that is clearly political, and increasingly economic, being always discussed in military terms. The solution to the Taiwan issue is not a military one, so we should discuss it in the layers of economy, politics, and culture.

Backup: Stopping Taiwan arms sales is key to improving US/China relations

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2013 (PhD in US diplomatic history; senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) 7 Nov 2013 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: A Delicate, Troublesome Issue <http://www.cato.org/blog/us-arms-sales-taiwan-delicate-troublesome-issue>

However, arms sales of any sort to Taipei have long been a major irritant in U.S.-China relations. Chinese leaders have never wavered in their contention that Taiwan is rightfully a part of China, and they view U.S. weapons sales as provocative. Beijing is especially wrathful about transfers of modern weapons with offensive potential. Selling the advanced F-16 models, the Apaches, or the Patriots would likely produce a surge in bilateral tensions. Washington and Beijing are already on poor terms regarding other issues, especially the Obama administration’s unsubtle support for East Asian countries challenging China’s territorial claims in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. U.S. officials need to proceed with considerable caution on the issue of arms sales. Understandably, Washington would like to see Taiwan maintain its de facto independence and remain out of Beijing’s political orbit. But a cordial relationship with China is important to America, both strategically and economically. The last thing this country needs is a renewed crisis in East Asia.

Backup: Taiwan arms sales damage US/China relationship and China/Taiwan relationship

Reuters news service 2014. China angered by latest U.S. arms sale plan for Taiwan 9 Apr 2014 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-china-usa-taiwan-idUSBREA380H520140409>

China's defense ministry expressed anger on Wednesday after the U.S. House of Representatives agreed to authorize the sale to Taiwan of four second-hand U.S. warships, saying the United States had ignored Chinese protests. China and Taiwan have been ruled separately since defeated Nationalist forces fled to the island at the end of a civil war with the communists in 1949. China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. The U.S. legislation also reaffirmed the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the United States to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of an attack, and was enacted in 1979 when Washington severed formal ties with the island in favor of recognizing the People's Republic of China in Beijing. China's defense ministry said it was resolutely opposed to all arms sales to Taiwan, saying it was an interference in China's internal affairs. "The U.S. side ignored China's strong opposition, and insisted on passing the bill pushing weapons sales to Taiwan," the ministry said in a statement on its website ([www.mod.gov.cn](http://www.mod.gov.cn)). "This act is highly damaging, and doubtless will seriously interfere in and damage the development of Sino-U.S. military ties and the peaceful development of cross-strait relations."

Backup: Taiwan is the most crucial issue in US/China relations, and arms sales hurt the relationship

Arms Control Association 2012 (national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies) updated Oct 2012 U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/taiwanarms>

China, which claims Taiwan is the "most crucial and most sensitive issue" in its relations with the United States, maintains that U.S. arms sales to Taipei infringe on China's sovereignty because Washington acknowledges that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing also charges that sales contradict the U.S.-China joint communiqué issued August 17, 1982. That document stated that the United States  
"Does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution."